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4. Optimal non-linear taxation of labour income
In the preceding sections source- and origin-based taxes are presented as an indirect means
of taxing labour at diﬀerent rates when the labour tax is linear. However, the informational
constraints do not bind the taxation on labour income to be linear: the government does not
need to know individual wages and the labour supply in order to implement a nonlinear tax
on labour income. Are source- and origin-based taxes still desirable when an optimal nonlinear
income tax is levied?
The analysis developed up to this point suggests a negative answer. With a nonlinear income
tax a diﬀerent marginal tax rate can be set for each type of labour. Hence, source- and origin-
based taxes cannot improve the distribution of net wages. However, I show in the following
that an alternative rationale for source- and origin-based taxation does exist: by changing the
distribution of gross wages, source- and origin-based taxes can relax the self-selection constraints
that bind the non-linear tax.
The optimal taxation problem can be set up, as in Stiglitz (1986), in the following way. Let
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be the direct utility function for consumers of type i where xji is the demand for commodity j.
A partially indirect utility function can be defined as follows,
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where mi represents after-tax labour income. Given that the labour supply is not observable, it
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is expedient to rewrite utility function (4.2) in terms of before-tax labour income Y i = wili:
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The tax paid by consumers of type i on labour income is given by Y i−mi. The assumption that
w1 > w2 in both the pre-tax and the post-tax situation guarantees the fulfilment of the single
crossing condition. Consequently, at most one of the two self-selection constraints is binding in
the optimum. If we consider the case where the self-selection constraint is binding for skilled
workers, the optimal source-based and income tax are given by the solution to the problem
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subject to the revenue and self-selection constraints
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The first of the two constraints requires that revenue should be suﬃcient to finance the exogenous
budget requirement R, while the second requires that skilled workers should not strictly prefer
the allocation assigned to the unskilled. The first order conditions for Y 1, Y 2 and tS read
respectively
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where µ is a non-negative scalar.6 By substituting (4.7) and (4.8) into the (4.9) and rearranging,
one obtains
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As for the linear case, (4.10) shows that the source-based tax is equal to zero only in two
instances. The first is when ε1wr = ε
2
wr, that is the two types of labour bear the same tax
burden. The second is when µ = 0, that is when the social optimum lies close to the competitive
allocation so that the redistribution desired by the government is not bound by either of the two
self-selection constraints. Consequently, the optimal allocation, represented by α1 = α2 = 1,
can be implemented through lump-sum taxes.
Proposition 4.1. Under an optimal non-linear tax on labour income, the optimal source-based
tax is diﬀerent from zero if and only both ε2wr 6= ε1wr and α1 6= α2 in competitive equilibrium
with incentive- compatible lump-sum taxation.
6The scalar µ is the ratio between the multiplier associated with the self-selection constraint and the multiplier
associated with the budget constraint. Both multipliers are non negative (Stiglitz 1986).
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Despite their similarity, the results stated in propositions (3.2) and (4.1) have rather diﬀerent
interpretations. In contrast with (3.20), the eﬀects of a marginal increase in the source-based
tax on consumers’ net income does not enter into (4.10) since the government can achieve the
optimal distribution of labour income that is consistent with the self-selection constraint through
the nonlinear labour tax. What is left is the eﬀect of the source-based tax on the self-selection
constraint itself. If
¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
>
¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯
, an increase in the source-based tax reduces the equilibrium
gross wage of the skilled, so that they find it more costly to mimic the behaviour of the unskilled
(as shown by the negative term inside the square brackets). Consequently, the self-selection
constraint is relaxed and social welfare can be improved (recollect that µ is non negative). By
the same token, when
¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
<
¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯
, a reduction in the source-based tax relaxes the self-selection
constraint and increases welfare.
As for the linear case, equation (4.10) shows that in equilibrium any positive eﬀect on welfare,
due to the relaxation of the self-selection constraint, must be counterbalanced by the revenue
loss due to the variation in capital invested in the country. This condition makes it possible
to determine the sign of the optimal tax rate. When
¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
>
¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯
, the government levies a
source-based tax. The tax rate is raised up to the point where the welfare gain due to relaxation
of the self-selection constraint is exactly oﬀset by the revenue loss due to capital outflow. When¯¯
ε2wr
¯¯
<
¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
, the government grants a subsidy. The subsidy rate is raised up to the point where
the welfare gain due to relaxation of the self-selection constraint is exactly oﬀset by the revenue
loss due to capital inflow.
The case analysed in this section, in which the self-selection constraint is binding for the
skilled, is usually regarded in the literature as the ”normal” case. Yet, the possibility of the
self-selection constraint being binding for the unskilled cannot be ruled out. Obviously, the
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foregoing analysis applies to this second case as well: by swapping the indices 1 and 2, one
can conclude that a source-based tax is levied when
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¯¯
<
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¯¯
and a subsidy granted when¯¯
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¯¯
>
¯¯
ε1wr
¯¯
. These results can be summarised using the fact that the self-selection is always
binding for the group with the lower social marginal utility of income.
Proposition 4.2. Under an optimal non-linear tax on labour income7 ,
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As explained in the preceding section, all the arguments developed for source-based taxation
on capital income apply to uniform origin-based commodity taxation. However, it is worth
investigating how the non-linear taxation of labour aﬀects the structure of optimal diﬀerential
commodity taxes. Diﬀerential origin-based commodity taxation can be introduced in problem
4.4 in the way described in section 3.3. The first-order conditions for Y 1, Y 2, t1O and t
2
O are
respectively
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7This result is equivalent to proposition 1 in Huber (1999).
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By substituting (4.12) into (4.14) and (4.13) into (4.15) and rearranging one gets
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These two conditions can be easily interpreted in the light of the arguments presented earlier.
As for source-based capital taxation, the redistribution of income brought about by the two
origin-based commodity taxes does not aﬀect welfare if an optimal non-linear income tax is
levied. Diﬀerential commodity taxation aﬀects welfare through the changes in the self-selection
constraint and government revenue. The two taxes have opposite eﬀects on the self-selection
constraint as an increase in the tax on commodity 1 always reduces the gross wage of skilled
workers while the opposite is true for the tax on commodity 2. This has two implications. First,
diﬀerential commodity taxation is optimal whenever the self-selection constraint is binding.
Second, since the same reduction in the skilled wage can be achieved either through an increase
in the tax rate on commodity 1 or through a reduction in the tax rate on commodity 2, in
order to determine the optimal tax rate ratio, the eﬀects on government revenue alone must be
considered. This can be easily seen by substituting condition (4.16) into (4.16). Surprisingly,
this substitution yields directly condition (3.34). Hence, we can state the following result:
Proposition 4.3. Condition (3.36) represents the structure of optimal origin-based commodity
taxation under both a linear and a non-linear income tax.
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